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 1
Know Your Enemy: Local Taxation and Tax Agreements in Indian Country 
Anthony S. Broadman1 
 
Intergovernmental disputes between tribes and their neighbors have educated 
states about tribal sovereignty.  What many state governments have learned, 
through litigation, political battle, and intergovernmental dispute, is that even 
when states have “won” tax disputes, they have lost.2  This dependably pyrrhic 
result has driven rational state actors—state taxing authorities acting consistently 
with their own best fiscal interests—to pursue negotiated agreements.  Today, 
state-tribal tax compacts, while often controversial,3 are commonplace. 
 
Counties and cities, on the other hand, with some admirable exceptions, have yet 
to learn, or heed, lessons from inter-local tax disputes.  As it stands, tribes must 
be prepared for future battles over local taxation in Indian Country, particularly in 
regard to real or personal property owned by tribes.  But as counties and 
municipal governments slowly learn the lessons already learned by the states, 
tribes should also be ready to negotiate intergovernmental solutions to inter-local 
tax disputes. 
 
The Backdrop in Brief 
 
Disputes between states and tribes are not a recent phenomenon.  Indeed, in 
1831, the seminal Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,4 which involved Georgia’s 
involuntary formation of “Cherokee County,” set the parameters of state-tribal 
relations adhered to today.  By 1885, in Utah & Northern Railway v. Fisher,5 the 
U.S. Supreme Court had embarked on the county-tribe property tax dispute 
odyssey—one that has usually harmed tribes.  While high profile tribal-state 
disputes continue to occur, a new generation of intergovernmental fights may 
soon outnumber them.  States’ local components—counties, cities, and 
municipalities—do not yet understand tribal sovereignty.  And as local 
                                                        
1
 Anthony S. Broadman is a partner with Galanda Broadman in Seattle, Washington.  His practice 
focuses on issues critical to Indian Country.  This paper stems from remarks made by the author 
at the 25th Annual Coming Together of Peoples Conference at the University of Wisconsin 
College of Law on March 25, 2011.  The author wishes to thank the University of Wisconsin Law 
School Indigenous Law Students Association for their gracious hospitality and for fostering an 
environment of exacting scholarship in the tribal tax arena.  All rights reserved. 
2
 See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
162 (1980) where the Court suggested that states are limited in their recourse when operating on 
reservation.  In Colville, the Court noted that “[i]t is significant that these seizures take place 
outside the reservation, in locations where state power over Indian affairs is considerably more 
expansive than it is within reservation boundaries.”  Id.; see also STUART THRONSON, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX AGREEMENTS: WASHINGTON STATE’S EXPERIENCE WITH CIGARETTE TAX 
COMPACTS 4 (2006) (noting the “hollow victory” of Colville) (on file with author).. 
3
 See Automotive United Trades Organization v. Washington, No. 10-5584, 2010 WL 4365576 
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2010) (Complaint available at http://www.autowa.org/pdf/Complaint.pdf). 
4
 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
5
 116 U.S. 28 (1885). 
           
 
 2
governments, now more than ever, struggle to fund operations, county-tribe 
disputes will arise.6 
 
The tribal-federalist system puts tribes in the awkward position of possessing a 
right to sovereign-to-sovereign relations with the United States and the individual 
states, but still needing, at times, to act as local governments.7  Not surprisingly, 
the jurisdictional overlap with other local governments drives tax disputes and 
can sour local relationships.  Within these inter-local tax disputes, it has been 
clear that local governments often fail to perceive tribes as sovereigns. 
 
Historically, counties have asserted taxing power over tribes in the property 
context.8  This is doubly problematic for tribal governments because tribal 
governments have a very different connection to tribal land than counties do to 
county land.  In addition, property taxation is philosophically difficult for tribal 
governments because tribal land is thought of as being tax exempt; however, as 
the Court has noted, “[g]eneralizations on this subject have become particularly 
treacherous.”9  The exceptions to the general rule of tax-exempt tribal land have 
formed the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of local taxation in Indian Country. 
 
For tribes, the wheels came off (or rather, the Court took them off) in the property 
tax context over the course of several cases.  In County of Yakima v. 
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation10 and City of Sherrill v. Oneida 
Indian Nation,11 the Court’s theory of interplay among local governments and 
tribes crystallized. 
 
In County of Yakima, the Court reaffirmed the general rule that states may not 
tax reservation lands or reservation Indians unless Congress has authorized 
state taxation and “made its intention to do so unmistakably clear.”12  But the 
Court went on to hold, nevertheless, that in the General Allotment Act,13 
Congress made its intention to permit local taxation of fee land on the Yakima 
reservation unmistakably clear.14  The legal acrobatics employed to find 
“unmistakable clarity” in the Allotment Act illustrated exactly how far the Court will 
                                                        
6
 These disputes have already arisen between local governments and the Oneida, 
Passamaquoddy, Cayuga, and other tribes. 
7
 See, e.g., Joseph Krist, Seminole Tribe Bets on Taxability, in THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL 
BONDS (Sylvan G. Feldstein & Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 2008) (discussing the issuance of 
government bonds by tribal governments). 
8
 See, e.g., United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903).  Counties have also asserted sales 
taxes on tribes.  See, e.g., County of Seneca v. Eristoff, No. 3172-06, 2006 WL 6312833 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Nov. 16, 2006). 
9
 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973). 
10
 502 U.S. 251 (1992). 
11
 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
12
 County of Yakama, 502 U.S. at 258 (citing Mescalero, 411 U.S. at 148, and Montana v. 
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 765 (1985)). 
13
 25 U.S.C. § 331 (repealed in part by the Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, 
Pub. L. 106-462, 114 Stat. 1991–2009). 
14
 County of Yakama, 502 U.S. at 258. 
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go to uphold state or county taxing authority.  In fact, the Allotment Act was so 
unmistakably unclear in the taxation of on-reservation fee land that even the 
United States joined the tribe in resisting the local tax.15   
 
In 2005, in City of Sherrill, the Court rejected the Oneida Nations’ position that its 
reunification of interests in particular parcels made such land non-taxable.  But 
when Madison County later sued Oneida to collect taxes, the tribe successfully 
enjoined collection based upon the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.16  What 
might have seemed like an appropriate assertion of tribal sovereign immunity put 
the tribe at a crossroads when the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to take Madison 
County’s appeal last year. 
 
Madison County v. Oneida: A Bullet Dodged 
 
The Supreme Court decided to hear Madison County v. Oneida in 2011, in part, 
to determine “whether tribal sovereign immunity from suit, to the extent it should 
continue to be recognized, bars taxing authorities from foreclosing to collect 
lawfully imposed property taxes.”  The case spelled disaster for the tribe.   
 
Madison and Oneida Counties argued in their merits brief that “[t]ribal sovereign 
immunity does not bar in rem foreclosure for nonpayment of real property taxes . 
. . .”
17
  The Counties synthesized City of Sherrill and County of Yakima into a 
proposed rule under which (1) the Court’s strongest sovereign immunity cases 
were inapplicable as in personam rather than in rem cases18 and (2) that the 
Court had already allowed something like what the Counties were asking for 
when it found congressional authorization for taxation in County of Yakima.19  In 
effect, the Counties were proposing a wholly novel in rem exception to tribal 
sovereign immunity in the property tax context. 
 
Had the Court heard the case and adopted the rule proposed by the Counties, 
states, counties, and other enemies of tribal self-governance might have still 
been barred from suing tribes.  But the exception would have allowed the states 
and their younger siblings to judicially take and sell tribes’ property.  In adopting 
the rule, the Court would have destroyed the very purpose of sovereign immunity 
as universally applied—that is, to protect assets of many from depredation by 
few.  
 
The Oneida Nation seems to have recognized what was at risk, and wisely 
mooted the dispute before the Roberts Court could rule on it by waiving its 
                                                        
15
 Brief of the California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 2010 WL 5178039 (U.S., 2010). 
16
 Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County, 605 F.3d 149 (2nd Cir. 2010). 
17
 Brief for Petitioners, Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 2010 WL 4973153, 
at *13 (U.S., 2010). 
18
 Never mind sovereign immunity is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. 
19
 Never mind that County of Yakima did not deal directly with sovereign immunity, let alone an in 
rem exception.   
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sovereign immunity for enforcement of real property taxation through foreclosure.  
As a result, in early January 2011, the Court remanded the case to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.20 
 
Taxation v. Collection 
 
As illustrated by Madison County, tribes have employed a second layer of 
defense in tax disputes: even when a federal court incorrectly upholds taxation in 
principle, taxing authorities may lack the ability to collect.  This approach does 
not require a tribe to ignore a court’s judgment, or disrespect federal court 
authority.  Rather, independent barriers to collection prevent county taxmen from 
realizing their putative victories.  Indeed, it is an approach that federal courts 
have implicitly endorsed, if not created.21       
 
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of 
Oklahoma,22 the Court recognized that, notwithstanding the challenges posed to 
state taxing bodies by the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine, state and local 
governments possess many “adequate alternatives” to collect taxes from tribal 
governments.23  In particular, the Court encouraged states to “enter into 
agreements with the tribes to adopt a mutually satisfactorily regime for the 
collection” of taxes.24  Therefore the only practical route for local governments 
seeking to collect taxes from tribes is one that has received the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s imprimatur. 
 
Adequate Alternatives   
 
Heeding the Court’s direction, states have entered into compacts regarding 
taxation of tribal lands and businesses.  The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 
1988 has also made compacts part of the intergovernmental vernacular.25  In this 
era of intergovernmental cooperation, the Washington State Department of 
                                                        
20
 Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 131 S.Ct. 704 (2011).  
21
 See Colville 447 U.S. at 162 ; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
22
 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
23
 Id. at 514. The Court’s four exclusive options for the collection of state tobacco taxes on 
reservation lands is equally, if not more, forceful in the county property taxation context: (1) 
collect taxes from wholesalers off reservation; (2) collect taxes from wholesalers who supply to 
tribal stores; (3) enter into agreements with tribes to collect the tax in a mutually agreeable way; 
or (4) seek appropriate legislation from Congress.  Id. at 514.  Importantly, physical entrance on 
the reservation was not an option offered by the Court.  See id.. 
24
 Id.; see also Anne Zimmermann, Taxation of Indians: An Analysis and Comparison of New 
Mexico and Oklahoma State Tax Laws, 41 TULSA L. REV. 91, 103, 112-14 (2005) (discussing the 
solution offered by Potawatomi, its adoption in the State of Oklahoma’s tax code, and suggesting 
that other states adopt similar compacting policies). 
25
 While IGRA requires states to negotiate compacts with tribes, Kenosha County and the 
Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin at least contemplated a comprehensive agreement, taking 
tax disputes into account, which would have included gaming revenue sharing between the tribe 
and county.  See INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF 
WISCONSIN AND THE CITY OF KENOSHA, WISCONSIN, available at 
http://www.kenosha.org/casino/FIGA.pdf. 
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Revenue, for instance, has recognized that while states have leverage over non-
Indians for taxation purposes, “[t]ribal economic development involves doing 
business with non-Indians.”26  For Washington State, the Colville case, which 
upheld taxes on nonmember tobacco buyers, was a “huge win on its face” but 
because it was “[s]ilent on methods to enforce collection of state taxes,” the state 
has recognized it was a “hollow victory.”27  According to the Department of 
Revenue, the Colville case did not end conflict, did not increase collections, 
increased intergovernmental tensions, and generally worsened relationships with 
the tribes.28  As a result, Washington began entering into cigarette compacts with 
tribes in 2001.  
 
As opposed to the zero-sum Colville era,29 a new and more dynamic state/tribal 
relationship exists today.  As noted by Professor Matthew Fletcher,  
 
States and tribes are beginning to smooth over the rough edges of 
federal Indian law—jurisdictional confusion, historical animosity 
between states and Indian tribes, competition between sovereigns 
for tax revenue, economic development opportunities, and 
regulatory authority—through cooperative agreements.  In effect, a 
new political relationship is springing up all over the nation between 
states, local units of government, and Indian tribes.30 
 
Once local governments begin to see tribes as partners and governments, 
and the benefits of cooperative agreements become clear, the spring of 
this new political relationship will arrive.  Unfortunately, it will fall to tribes 
to change this interpolitical paradigm and teach local governments that 
compacts can be mutually beneficial.     
 
Successful Compacts between Tribes and Local Governments 
 
Many tribes and states understand that the future of tribal-state relations involves 
government-to-government negotiation, accord, and agreement.31  In fact, 
“[n]early every state that has Indian lands within its borders has reached some 
type of tax agreement with the tribes.”32  Despite the examples that have winded 
                                                        
26
 THRONSON, supra note 2, at 4. 
27
 Id. at 8. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Often, states would invoke their tax powers to purposefully exploit Indians and Indian tribes.  
See, e.g., JAMES M. MCCLURKEN, A VISUAL CULTURE HISTORY OF THE LITTLE TRAVERSE BAY BANDS 
OF ODAWA GAH-BAEH-JHAGWAH-BUK: THE WAY IT HAPPENED 79 (1991) (noting that it was the policy 
of Emmett County, Michigan, to purposely tax Odawa Indians until they lost their lands). 
30
 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 
TULSA L. REV. 73, 74 (2007). 
31
 Id. at 83.  This was made clear by the U.S. Commission on Tribal-State Relations as early as 
1981.  See generally EARL S. MACKEY & PHILIP S. DELORIA, STATE-TRIBAL AGREEMENTS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY (U.S. Comm’n. on Tribal-State Relations, 1981). 
32
 Judy Zelio, Piecing Together the State-Tribal Tax Puzzle (2005), 
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12662 (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) (citing SUSAN JOHNSON, 
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their way up into the Court, many local governments are coming to recognize that 
intergovernmental accord offers an alternative to realizing nothing from tax 
disputes.  Moreover, these agreements allow tribes to protect their interests 
against enemies of tribal self-governance by achieving certainty regarding inter-
local relations.  Ideally, this certainty will keep tribes out of the federal courts.  
 
The Southern Ute Indian Tribe and the County of La Plata, Colorado, for 
example, have compacted to resolve property tax disputes.  Under the terms of 
their 1996 compact,33 the state and county agreed not to seek any tax on tribal 
non-trust property.  “Property” under the terms of the compact refers to both real 
property and mineral lease interests, and applies to both ad valorem and 
severance taxes.34  In recognition of the state and county relinquishment of 
taxing efforts, the tribe agreed to make annual voluntary payments of 
approximately one-third of the value of taxes that would have been collected if 
the property were not tribally owned.  If a dispute arises under the compact, both 
parties have agreed to effectively waive their sovereign immunity by submitting to 
binding arbitration.35 
 
In addition, the Snoqualmie Tribe and the City of Snoqualmie in Washington 
State have entered into a successful inter-local agreement.36  Under this 
agreement, the tribe pays the city for police, fire, and emergency medical 
services.37  The tribe pays for any additional amenities required by these 
services, including the use of a jail cell or officer assistance.38  The compact also 
provides for sewer lines to and from the tribe’s property.39  
Moreover, in Louisiana, the Chitimacha Tribe and the Parish40 of St. Mary have 
entered into a compact that exempts the tribe from parish tax.41  Essentially, this 
                                                                                                                                                                     
JEANNE KAUFMAN, JOHN DOSSETT & SARAH HICKS, GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT: MODELS OF 
COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES AND TRIBES (2002)).  
33
 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-61-102 (1996).  
34
 Id. at § 24-61-102.3. 
35
 Id. at § 24-61-102.12.01. 
36
 Agreement Between the City of Snoqualmie and the Snoqualmie Tribe for the Provision of 
Police, Fire, and Emergency Medical Services to the Snoqualmie Hills Project and Sewer Utility 
Service to the Tribe’s Initial Reservation, available at 
www.awcnet.org/apps/ma/projects/2004SnoqualmieTribe.doc. 
37
 Id. at §§ 2.2-2.3.  Under the agreement, the city provides the tribe with police services in 
exchange for $140,000 per year, plus $50,000 for a new police cruiser.  In addition, the city 
provides the tribe with fire and emergency medical services in exchange for $150,000 per year.  
This amount covers the cost of two firefighters and 40% of the leasing expense for new ladder 
truck. 
38
 Id. at § 2.2. 
39
 Id. at § 2.6; see also Joe Kimball, Mdewakanton Sioux Helping Pay for Road Construction in 
Scott County, MINNPOST, Apr. 12, 2011, available at 
http://www.minnpost.com/politicalagenda/2011/04/12/27404/mdewakanton_sioux_helping_pay_fo
r_road_construction_in_scott_county.  The Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community voluntarily 
contributing $1.65 million for reconstruction of a busy intersection near its Mystic Lake Casino.  
Id. 
40
 Louisiana’s equivalent to a county. 
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compact grants the tribe a status akin to that of a 501(c)(3) non-profit 
organization.  
As illustrated by the three examples above, despite what local governments 
might claim, tax agreements are possible.  While county lawyers will often cite (1) 
a general lack of authority to enter into such agreements and (2) a general lack 
of centralized taxing authority to execute such agreements, those agreements 
that exist suggest counties can find authority when they want to.  Moreover, 
counties themselves receive millions in Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILTS) every 
year from the federal government.42  Clearly, solutions are possible.  
 
And they are desirable.  Tax agreements provide, at minimum, “some level of 
predictable revenue” for both county and tribal governments.43  Agreements also 
answer regulatory questions created by ambiguities in inter-local jurisdictional 
authority, reduce the need for costly and contentious intergovernmental litigation, 
and offer greater flexibility to accommodate the needs of state and tribal 
governments.44  Further, intergovernmental tax compacts neatly fit on-the-ground 
realities of taxation involving Indian tribal communities.  The purpose of local 
taxes is to “finance the activities of government in providing goods and services 
to the public.  Only those who benefit from the goods and services should pay for 
them.”45    
 
In many, if not most regions, state and local governments are already aptly 
compensated for the services that they provide to tribal members.46  Under the 
economics of “tax exporting,” it is frequently tribal governments—not state or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
41
 Sales Tax Exemption Certificate for Purchases of Motor Vehicles by the Chitimacha Indian 
Tribe or Its Tribal Government Agencies Compact Between the State and the Chitimacha Tribe, 
Form No. 1044(9/07), available at 
http://revenue.louisiana.gov/forms/taxforms/1044%289_07%29F.pdf. 
42
 See generally U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Payments in Lieu of Taxes, http://www.doi.gov/pilt (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2012). 
43
 Mark J. Cowan, Double Taxation in Indian Country: Unpacking the Problem and Analyzing the 
Role of the Federal Government in Protecting Tribal Governmental Revenues, 2 PITT. TAX REV. 
93, 134 (2005). 
44
 Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 922, 929 (1999) [hereinafter Intergovernmental Compacts]. 
45
 But see Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State 
Taxation, 63 TAX LAW. 897, 1016 (2010) (noting “[t]he inherent weakness with this type of 
argument is the amorphous nature of government-provided benefits, opportunities, and 
protections.”); Robert William Alexander, The Collision of Tribal Natural Resource Development 
and State Taxation: An Economic Analysis, 27 N.M. L. REV. 387, 389 (1997) (noting that “little 
actual economic analysis has been done to determine the probable effects and burdens of the 
taxation doctrine that has developed” between tribes and states).  
46
 See VERONICA E. TILLER & ROBERT A. CHASE, ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTIONS OF INDIAN TRIBES TO 
THE ECONOMY OF WASHINGTON STATE (1998); Economic Development; S. Hrg. 105-572 Before the 
Sen. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. 129 (1998) (Prepared Statement of Robert F. 
Robinson, President, Center for Applied Research, Inc.).  In addition to tribal compensation to 
state and local government, the federal government provides financial assistance to local 
educational agencies that educate children residing on Indian lands to offset any impact to local 
government caused by the a state’s inability to tax tribal  lands.  20 U.S.C. §§ 7701, 7704(a). 
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local governments—who bear a disproportionate financial burden associated with 
taxation vis-à-vis local services rendered.47  One study, for example, found that 
“[o]n most reservations, there are few retail stores and tribal members must go 
off reservation and pay state taxes on everything they buy.  Nationwide, this 
amounts to $246 million annually in tax revenues to state governments, while 
states expend only $226 million annually on behalf of reservation residents.”48  
Intergovernmental tax compacting allows for taxation to be commensurate with 
services rendered, taking into account the unique relationships between tribes 
and their neighboring jurisdictions.49   
 
Conclusion 
 
In the era of federal Indian self-determination, government-to-government tax 
compacts provide tribal governments with a “proactive assertion of their right to 
self government” that is necessary for economic and political independence.50  
By reorganizing their taxing and other relationships with local governments, as 
they have with states, and in turn exercising and strengthening tribal self-
determination at the local level, tribal governments reduce their historic 
dependence on the federal government.51  And “[e]ach time a state or local 
government agrees to negotiate with an Indian tribe and . . . execute a binding 
agreement . . . that non-Indian government is recognizing the legitimacy of the 
tribal government,” and vice versa.52   
                                                        
47
 See generally Alexander, supra note 45. 
48
 Tax Fairness and Tax Base Protection: Hearing on H.R. 1168 Before the House Comm. on 
Resources, 105th Cong. (testimony of W. Ron Allen, President, National Congress of American 
Indians).  Generally, tribes bring in much economic stability for the surrounding local government.  
One example is the Impact Aid Laws of 1950, which provides funding to local school districts who 
educate Indian Children.  See Pub. L. No. 81-874, 64 Stat. 1100, as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-
561, 92 Stat. 2315, 20 U.S.C. § 7704; see also STEPHEN CORNELL, JOSEPH KALT, MATTHEW 
KREPPS, & JONATHAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN INDIAN GAMING POLICY AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS: 
A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION 40–50 (1998) (noting that tribal 
gaming enterprises contribute significantly to the economic conditions of their surrounding non-
tribal communities).  States also gain large incomes from possessory interest taxes on Indian 
lands.  See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 175 (1989). 
49
 In some situations, states even give up their claims to tax in favor of a tribal tax “in order to 
support tribal economic development, similar to tax exemptions given to private businesses.”  
Zelio, supra note 32; see also Intergovernmental Compacts, supra note 44 at 929 (noting that 
“negotiated compacts offer greater flexibility to accommodate local needs and changed 
circumstances over time”).  What is more, the phenomenon of intergovernmental agreements is 
also being carried out across the United States, between state, county and municipal 
jurisdictions.  One study, for example, estimates that as of 1999, 45 states were using inter-local 
service and/or fee-for-service agreements as the mechanism by which to provide their citizens 
with public services.  Anne F. Peterson, The Utilization of Interlocal Service Agreements (Aug. 7, 
2008) (unpublished paper, William Mitchell College of Law) (on file with author).  It is further 
estimated that over 50% of all cities and counties use such inter-local agreements.  Id. 
50
 Marren Sanders, Ecosystem Co-Management Agreements: A Study of Nation Building or a 
Lesson or Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty?, 15 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 100 (2008). 
51
 See generally Stephen Cornell & Joseph Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The 
Development Challenge in Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 193 (1998). 
52
 Fletcher, supra note 30, at 87. 
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Tribes can and will fight inappropriate local government taxation in federal courts.  
But litigation should be the last resort.  Not only are federal courts unfriendly to 
tribal interests, but, as compared to cities and counties, tribes have far more to 
lose on their own behalf and on that of their sister tribes.  Government-to-
government arrangements at the local level allow tribes to secure some measure 
of certainty by binding counties, cities, and their future leaders.  The 
intergovernmental agreement may be commonplace with states, but it is difficult 
for their younger siblings to grasp.  
 
Local governments may, at times, be the “deadliest enemies” of tribal self-
governance.53  But times are changing.  As tribes become more politically active 
at the local and state government levels, there is a strong opportunity for them to 
support state political candidates who are savvy about the contours of Indian law, 
if not supportive of tribal sovereignty and self-governance.54  As difficult as it may 
seem for tribes to stoop to the local governmental level, counties and cities will 
not educate themselves.  It is up to tribes to teach local government actors how 
to behave like good neighbors, and secure the kind of jurisdictional and legal 
certainty necessary for sustainable economic growth in Indian Country. 
                                                        
53
 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). 
54
 Ryan Dreveskracht, In the Courts of Your Deadliest Enemy, 19 INDIAN L. NEWSL. 4, 11 (2012). 
